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How to win the argument for Lords reform
Guy Lodge  and Michael Kenny make the case for a stronger second chamber.
As with so many previous attempts, last week’s push to ref orm the House of  Lords
descended into f arce. Its main proponent, Nick Clegg, insists that the f ight goes on, but
f ew now believe he will achieve his historic dream of  an elected Lords.
Stepping aside f rom all the partisan squabbles and naked polit icking, it is worth ref lecting
on why the case f or ref orm – which has historically appeared self -evident to most
progressives – has been blunted on this occasion, and has f ailed to touch the public
imagination.
The major weakness of  the current ref orm case concerns the impact an elected Lords
would have on the Commons. The trap which pro-ref ormers have f allen into is to claim
that an elected Lords, armed with its own democratic mandate, would not alter the
relationship between the Lords and Commons. Of  course the f undamental ‘primacy’ of
the Commons would be guaranteed by the Parliament Acts (which give the Commons the f inal word on
most legislation), and by the f act that the Commons would continue to f orm the Government of  the day
and control the money it spends. And additional saf eguards such as those set out in the Bill, including
measures to ensure that the Commons always has the most recent electoral mandate, would also help
protect the Commons.
Yet, there is no getting away f rom the f act that if  one of  the reasons f or having a predominantly elected
Lords is, as Clegg and other ref ormers believe, to ensure greater legit imacy f or the second chamber,
then that chamber will, necessarily become more assertive. And, as all the comparative evidence shows,
an elected Lords would be especially assertive when the party composition of  the two houses was out
of  sync with each other, as would quite of ten be the case. Election would theref ore strengthen the
constitutional posit ion of  the Lords.
This shouldn’t surprise us. We know f rom recent experience that even quite limited ref orm to the status
of  the Lords will change the dynamic between the two Houses. The removal of  most of  the hereditaries
in 1999, which, crucially, also meant that no single party holds a majority, signif icantly boosted the Lords’
sense of  legit imacy and empowered it to challenge the government. Unsurprisingly, the number of
government def eats in the Lords has risen sharply since hereditary privilege was removed.
Should the Lords be elected then it would undoubtedly become more f eisty but rather than deny this pro-
ref ormers should seek to make a virtue out of  it. The most obvious way to do this is to ref rame the
argument f or change in terms of  enhancing the relationship between parliament and the government. An
elected Lords, which no single party controlled, would make f or a stronger parliament and strengthen the
ability of  the legislature to hold the government of  the day to account. Alongside this ref ormers should
also be advocating mechanisms f or managing disputes between an elected Lords and Commons, and
developing concrete ways to delineate the powers of  the Lords, such as extending the scope of  the
Parliament Acts and perhaps reducing f urther the period of  t ime f or which they can delay bills.
This issue aside, why is it that the case f or ref orm has not become a more popular cause? The easy
answer beloved of  many parliamentarians is that issues of  constitutional process and polit ical structure
are perceived as irrelevant or incomprehensible to a public f ocused entirely upon economic issues. But
this overlooks those periods when Lords ref orm has struck a chord with ref orming movements and party
memberships, of ten at moments of  wider economic and polit ical crisis, most obviously during the Liberal
Government’s great Peers versus the People campaign at the beginning of  the last century.
What has been most lacking in the current debate is a compelling rationale f or change linked to the
circumstances of  today. A more dynamic and populist case – of  the kind that a polit ician like Lloyd George
would have assembled – would resonate with authentic public concerns about the perceived
unaccountable nature of  government in the UK, and the increasingly apparent hoarding of  power among
a set of  interlocking polit ical, economic and media elites.
History suggests that no constitutional change – no matter how compelling it appears on paper – gains
traction unless it is perceived to represent a clear solution to pressing problems. Scottish devolution
became the solution to the democratic crisis sparked by Thatcher ’s conspicuous absence of  a mandate
to govern Scotland. The Parliament Act of  1911 was a response to a prof ound power struggle that arose
when the Lords tried to sabotage Lloyd George’s People’s Budget. Conversely, polit ical ref orm goes
nowhere when it is unclear what it is intended to remedy. Did anyone seriously believe that the Alternative
Vote was an answer to any of  the weaknesses of  our democracy?
The case f or Lords ref orm needs theref ore to be rooted in an account of  how power should be most
ef f ectively and sustainably exercised in a 21st century democracy. This debate is happening at a t ime
when sections of  the public who have become deeply disillusioned by how elites controlling the core
institutions of  our economic and polit ical systems have misused the power entrusted to them. What links
the crises that have recently engulf ed the banks, parliament and the media is that they have ult imately
been triggered by concentrations of  unaccountable power. The ref orms we most need are those that
begin to challenge and open up these f orms of  power ‘hoarding’. Electing the House of  Lords is a small,
but actually quite important, and hugely symbolic, step in this direction. Of  course it is not a panacea f or
the problems of  irresponsible bankers and over-mighty media moguls. But by creating a stronger, and
more legit imate, second chamber, we would have a better chance of  holding the power concentrated in
our ‘core executive’ to account. We might also have a wing of  the legislature that would be suf f iciently
powerf ul to stand aside f rom, and question, the orthodoxies that led, f or instance, to light- touch
regulation of  our banks and the mountain of  household indebtedness that f uelled the polit ical economy
of  the previous era.
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